War and Society

Authority From the Authorities!

At last! Some kind of clarity on why we're in Afghanistan, and also, some kind of idea of when we're likely to be out. "End state, not end date." Don't know who said that, will have to find out tomorrow, but it appears that that is what the new Defense Secretary, Liam Fox is suggesting today.

In this post, Helmand Blog author Major Paul Smyth, picks out the key points from an interview given by Dr Fox (ha! But he actually is a doctor). Perhaps the most important is the assertion that:

"Success means a stable enough Afghanistan, able to manage its own internal and external security without our involvement there.

"That means getting the Afghan National Security Forces up to strength, training them as quickly as we can so that they can carry out that role of their security and we can come home."

A stable enough Afghanistan, so that we can come home. That is a perfect endeavour. Remains to be seen whether the government will have the stones to back it up, if people start complaining that "it's taking too long."

This is going to be a long, slow, painful process. To quote Lawrence again: "Like eating soup with a knife."

Buying One And Operating Another?

Yesterday, I came across this article on War is Boring. I made a Post-It note and stuck it to my laptop so that I would remember what I had planned to do this morning.

It worked, and I have read the article in full. Seems like a strange paradox. The armies of the world are working to operate in smaller, less intense situations. The 'Surges' in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example. Both operations have, by and large, seen armies scaling down, operating more with infantry and patrols and reducing the sizes of the operational platforms.

The opposite appears to be true for navies. (And to a certain extent air forces, the recent gagging of a critic of the Pentagon’s new "gajillion-dollar fighter jet" is a case in point.) Robert Gates' recent announcement that the US navy shouldn't expect backing for the carrier fleets it desires is a clear example of this. However, Gates is also the man responsible for the cancellation of the much-vaunted Future Combat Systems programme. The paradoxes and complexities of these things never cease to amaze.

This debate is a tricky one. There is arguably little need for the US to overload on carriers and gajillion-dollar fighter jets. However, it is also vitally important for the US to maintain its big-scary, 'can-of-whoopass', even though it might tend to make her look rather imperialistic. Concerns such as those of Douglas MacGregor, that by focusing on the small wars which dominate military thinking today, we run the risk of "understanding that future conflicts will involve wars among nations and alliances of nations waged by powerful armed forces for regional power and influence; fights for energy, water, food, mineral resources and the wealth they create," are unfounded and unhelpful in terms of establishing the militaries required to fight the wars of today.

These wars will be largely low-intensity affairs. Navies will serve a similar purpose to that which they have held to this day, however, as Paul van Riper demonstrated in Millennium Challenge 2002, carriers are likely to be more vulnerable than opportunistic, especially since airpower is less and less effective, from a grand strategic standpoint.

Better Understanding?

From what little I know about the "human terrain" element of counterinsurgency, I was struck by this piece at Danger Room. It's talking about using sociologists and ethnographers (yes... I looked it up) to help military planners "better understand Africa and its peoples, and perhaps provide some 'early warning' to prevent conflicts before they start."

While trying not to be over-critical, I can't help but think this is horribly patronising, and that it runs the risk of oversimplifying a very complex set of dynamics.

It smacks of old-skool colonialism. The idea of helping planners "better understand Africa" sounds to me an awful lot like the rhetoric and 'logic' of the British and other European nations at the start of their empires. "We must civilise the natives."

Of course, what this is all essentially focussed on, and what taunted me like a cat playing with a mouse throughout the researching and writing of my dissertation, is the left-brain-centric Western world's attempt to qualitatively analyse social structures.

This is simply not possible. While it does not necessarily hinder progress, it's just another layer to an unnecessary debate, which doesn't allow any kind of real progress to be made. Rather than keep having to deal with nonsensical decrees from on high, soldiers on the ground should be given a remit to do whatever is required, within set boundaries.

This is what General Sir Gerald Templar was getting at when he prescribed this method:

1. Get the priorities right.
2. Get the instructions right.
3. Get the organisation right.
4. Get the right people into the organisation.
5. Get the right spirit into the people.
6. Leave them to get on with it.¹

I'm not suggesting that COIN is easy, simply that it benefits from consistency of message. I think that it is a boring process. It's not like the common conception of war. It is a long, messy process, "like eating soup with a knife."² It takes patience and the will to allow commanders on the ground to be involved in the planning of operations within their areas of responsibility.

As much as people love to write about it, myself included, counterinsurgency is not something that you can learn from a book.

Footnotes:

1. John Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya. The Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, (London: Harrap, 1985), 227, cited in John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 90.
2. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph, (London: Penguin, 1971).

Fungus the Bogeyman

This article from Helmand Blog talks about something which had not really crossed my mind until this morning. (Although, looking back through my notes, it was something that I wrote down.)

Apparently NATO is being blamed for the spread of a fungus which is "thought to have infected about half of the country's poppy crop." This to me is indicative of NATO's continued refusal to look beyond the strategy of eradication, and consider other, more COIN-friendly methods of mitigating Afghanistan's truly awesome capacity to grow poppies.

Any moves away from eradication though, according to World Policy Review, are seen by the Russians as evidence of "US and NATO forces in Afghanistan ... 'conniving with drug producers'" (That's pretty much all I could read of that article, since I haven't subscribed...) But then, that would assume that the US is going to pay some kind of attention to the Russians. When clearly this isn't necessarily the case, as this quote from Nathan Hodge's post on Danger Room shows: "Anatoly Sitnov, the former head of procurement for Russia’s armed forces, had a better (and more eeeevil!) quote. 'Who owns space, owns the world,' he said. 'When we tried to test laser weapons in space, we were told that the militarization of outer space must not occur and we stopped, but the United States has started and continues to test these weapons even today.'"

Despite what the Russians think about non-eradication policies being indicative of collusion, eradication is simply counterproductive in terms of counterinsurgency doctrine. Therefore, while it's possible that the US have poisoned Afghan poppies, it would be highly unwise for them to do so.

In this recent GAO report, comes the suggestion that eradication may not be the best strategy. Although it still consumes ~40% of the State and Defence department budgets (page 5). Eradication simply is not the way. I've cited this piece before, but this sentence sums it up for me:

"Karzai had long opposed aerial eradication, saying it would be misunderstood as some sort of poison coming from the sky."

This BBC report points out that "about a decade ago, we know that the UN and British scientists were trying to develop a fungus, which would destroy the opium poppies grown here in Afghanistan."

Perhaps this was refering to Pleospora papaveracea (there's an article about it here), which was developed during the first decade of this century. I suppose it'll be nigh on impossible to know for sure, though.

While I hope, for the good of the counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan, that this is not the case, if it is, and the Americans (or NATO) are poisoning Afghan poppies, it would be indicative of a larger trend in the US ignoring lessons, left, right and centre again.

Some day, maybe, they'll learn. I should finish Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife.

100-150 Times a Day?

There are myriad problems, hypocracies and inconsistencies with the American approach to the "War on Drugs".

This is one of them.

This video is disturbing, but you should see it. If only to see how the American law enforcement agency goes about policing its people.

http://www.theagitator.com/2010/05/05/video-of-swat-raid-on-missouri-family/

While the police chief's assertion that “[i]t was not a mistake to shoot the pit bull,” might be true, to some degree, it's one of those childish "He started it" arguments.

It was most certainly a mistake (understatement of the century) by the police to allow armed, armoured police officers to enter, by force, the home of one of their citizens and subject his family to the unnecessary disruption they caused.

Perhaps the uproar caused by this video (the police force has received numerous complaints and a death threat by fax machine), which currently has ... 851,326 views on YouTube (and the delightfully misspelled caveat "WARNING: This video contains graphic or objectionable content or langauge") will cause some kind of a change. Particularly given the recent damning report on the "success" of the War on Drugs".

What's more disturbing about the whole thing is that this happens 100-150 times a day. I remember reading about an incident like this in one of Malcolm Gladwell's books. It's not a new phenomenon. Perhaps the internet will triumph once again, and demonstrate the American establishment that this is not really an acceptable way to treat voters.

Is Change Afoot?

After a century of failed policies, since the drug problems of individual countries were collectivized by the 1909 Shanghai International Opium Commission, it seems that global drug policy might be on the brink of changing. In an article for Transnational Institute last month, Tom Kramer, critiqued a recent review of drug research, arguing that "'Drug War' Policies Need a Stint in Rehab."

He showed that "[a]n examination of all English-language scientific literature dating back more than 20 years reveals that drug law enforcement dramatically escalates drug-market violence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a startling 82 percent of the studies found the various wars on drugs in countries and internationally simply increase violence." This is something that has been argued by scholars, and ignored by politicians with equal vigour, for the duration of the century-old 'War on Drugs'.

The voices of reason, arguing for mitigation and regulation of national drug 'problems', are getting louder, and apparently being heard more and more. However, there remains an undercurrent of narrow-mindedness about US policy making. "Voices for eradication are strong in the United States," suggests Vanda Felbab-Brown, (quote from this Foreign Policy in Focus article) but, she points out, "rural development" policies take time to establish. And that "despite a good policy — we may not see deep reductions in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for several years."

Although from what I understand from reviews, and my limited reading (been snowed under with dissertation &c.), of Shooting Up, Felbab-Brown does not see the conflation of COIN and CONA as helping the causes of either counterinsurgency or counter-narcotics operations, this long-term approach, in which "we may not see deep reductions in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for several years," is a key tenet of COIN theory. COIN operations take time (the British army spent twelve years subduing the Malayan Emergency) and it is often difficult to discern successes along the way.

The shift of US policy away from eradication is a good thing. Many farmers consider it an unfair practice. It is also a key factor in the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai told Thomas Schweich in 2008 that the Afghan people might misunderstand aerial spraying as “some sort of poison coming from the sky.” So moving the policy away from eradication and towards policies of mitigation and regulation, rather than prohibition, as is becoming the thinking in Washington, is likely to have untold positive impacts on the COIN operations in Afghanistan.

Interestingly though, while the decision to pursue eradication programmes in Afghanistan were based on 'successful' eradication schemes in Latin America and Pakistan (Schweich again: "Eradication was an essential component of successful anti-poppy efforts in Guatemala, Southeast Asia and Pakistan."), the same 'policy parity' is not being applying retroactively. Foreign Policy in Focus writer Coletta Youngers points out, "Although the US government may have learned a lesson about forced eradication in Afghanistan, it has yet to apply it to Latin America. On the contrary, U.S. officials have consistently stated that such an approach should not be adopted in Latin America, erroneously claiming that the existence of stronger institutions provides the conditions for successful implementation of forced eradication. Yet, as in Afghanistan, forced eradication in the Andean region has failed to achieve its desired objectives." (Original emphasis).

Further, she suggests that "One key reason for this policy stagnation is that the drug war bureaucracy remains intact." This is an inevitability of bureaucracies, but it will change, given the correct focus. This is evidenced in Youngers' closing comments about the current discussions redressing the foci of drug policies away from ineffective prohibitional models and towards more fleixble and realistic policies of regulation and harm reduction.

The Curse of the Ivory Tower

In light of yesterday’s post, some changes were made, and apologies offered. I spoke to a friend of mine, far more experienced in matters Internet than I, after amending the post.

I like to consider myself somewhat knowledgeable about the Internet. I’m a disciple of Clay Shirky. I like his ideas about the power of wasted time in the development of Wikipedia, and the arguments that he puts forth about the way that people organise themselves on the Internet. However, I am very much an amateur in its use. The conversation that I had, and the experience this morning had a significant impact on my mindset. Two things have changed:

First, Sam pointed out that “you have to be very careful when criticizing soldiers. They’re willing to lay down their lives for you. And at the moment, I’m not prepared to sign on that dotted line.” This is something that I will endeavour to be more conscious of in future.

Second, it demonstrates something that I was aware of about the Internet, but inexperienced in: the impersonal aspect of it makes it easy to ignore someone’s feelings, or how they may react to something.

Something that I have always sought, is to, once my academic career is over, remove myself as far as possible from the Ivory Tower, and to interact ‘on the ground’ with whatever it is that I am interested in at the time. It’s not possible for me to do that at the moment. However, in accordance with Tim Ferriss’s (that’s a lot of s’s lined up there) advice, “Ready, Fire, Aim.”

So, until I can get out of the Ivory Tower, and until I have experience on the ground, I will reserve judgement on the work of soldiers. I have acknowledged in the past that it's not a job that anyone who hasn't done it can imagine doing.

I will keep doing what I am doing here, assessing policies and ideas, but, I shall reserve judgement on their outcomes.

Moshtarak's Failings Continue (Revisited)

EDIT: This piece has been heavily edited in light of a comment received from Capt. Dyer himself this morning, pointing out a few things that I had missed. Says something about a lack of context, perhaps. I apologize for taking the video out of context. The field in the background of the video looked red. Once again "assume makes an ass of u and me."

So perhaps the only gripe I could have would be the use of the name "Route Dorest" to designate the road. This might just be the British army's designation, but I feel like, from what I understand about counterinsurgency, perhaps a more local sounding name would be preferable, if we're to be out of there, in the long term.

Further, Capt. Dyer pointed out that after the removal of the device, "two local nationals thanked us - they had ridden their motorbikes almost right over the device without knowing it was there. Riding slightly to the left or right would have resulted in a fatality."

For this, I apologize once again. More thorough research is perhaps required in future.

The post itself, edited in light of Capt. Dyer's comments, continues below:

Yesterday's post on the ICOS assessment of Operation Moshtarak suggested that perhaps it isn't being as successful as NATO might have hoped. This is compounded by this piece from the New York Times, which suggests that, because "[o]pium is the main livelihood of 60 to 70 percent of the farmers in Marja, ... American Marines occupying the area are under orders to leave the farmers’ fields alone."

One of my pet hates in the counterinsurgency arena is what I call 'clumsy COIN'. The term was born in the essay that I wrote which started this adventure. Specifically, it was page 69 of this report by ICOS (then Senlis) which used the example of a piece of Taliban propaganda showing a uniformed male soldier bodily searching an Afghan woman, accompanied with the text: “We cannot stand back and watch as foreigners touch our women. Something must be done.”

So, when the American commander in charge of troops in Marjah pointed out that “Marja is a special case right now,” suggesting, as should really be obvious, “[w]e don’t trample the livelihood of those we’re trying to win over, but the picture ”

While this is not in Marjah, the general feeling of discontent among Afghan farmers, 66% of whom, according to the Mostarak: Lessons Learned Report (page 20), believe that destroying poppy crops is bad.

Maybe I should post something more positive tomorrow. Perhaps something like this, from 1^st April, 2010. What's funny about this, however, is the fact that "[i]t may not feature very highly in Nato's counter-insurgency manual but British forces have discovered that one way to triumph in the most vital battle of the Afghan war, winning over the hearts and minds of the local population, is through their goats and sheep."

That makes perfect sense to me. But maybe that's just me.

Below is the section which caused offense:

Clumsy COIN is how I would describe the final few seconds of this video from the excellent Helmand Blog. In the midst of congratulating themselves for the 'success' of Moshtarak, Capt. Ciaron Dyer explains how his team dealt with an IED on 'Route Dorset' (splendidly Arabic sounding name) "ordinarily, I'd consider blowing it in-situ, having removed the components for further analysis. However, in this instance, it would have risked damaging the road too much." In light of this, the team thoughtfully remove the device from the road. However, the video then shows impressive footage of the device being detonated. In the middle of a poppy field in full flower.

Nice work guys.

Agreement on Ends But Not on Means

“Operation Moshtarak not only failed to win the hearts and minds of the people of Marjah, but it has actually driven them further away from the international community.”

That is the conclusion of this report from the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in its analysis of the NATO and ANA assault on the town of Marjah in Helmand Province.

ICOS’s own research demonstrates that the operation has had an overall negative effect on the situation in that area. Their research showed that 68% of Afghans interviewed believed that the Taliban would return to the region, when NATO/ANA forces withdrew. This is particularly alarming when you consider that, according to ICOS, 96% of people surveyed believed that over the last year, more young Afghans have joined the Taliban, and that 78% of people said that they “often or always feel angry.” (page 10) The report makes no bones about the fact that this led to “legitimate grievances.” These kinds of figures don’t bode well for the counterinsurgent forces and the progress of the counterinsurgency operations there.

Another key phrase ‘agreement on ends but not means’ dominates the report. “[L]ocals do not want the Taliban to return but they also do not want to endure unnecessary suffering as part of NATO’s response to the insurgency.” (page 3) This presents a difficult situation for NATO, as it seeks to withdraw its troops and leave a sturdy Afghan security force, capable of keeping the Taliban unpopular and out of business. However, there are ways out. The ICOS report suggests that the Taliban have been able to sell NATO as invading and, worse from the point of view of a Muslim, crusading force. As Boris Johnson pointed out in his two documentary series on the rise of the Roman Empire, and his book, The Dream of Rome, Muslims are averse to the term 'Crusade' for obvious reasons.

It is with this in mind that ICOS report's suggestion that "Restoring Mosques and Shrines ... would also work to counteract the Taliban propaganda, which always portrays Westerners as anti-Muslim and seeking to destroy Afghanistan's cultural and religious heritage," is inspired. Coupled with this, the report also calls for a "Quran Distribution Programme," suggesting that "[p]ossesion of copy of the Holy Quran is highly valued among rural Afghans yet unattainable to many because of widespread poverty." And that this programme "would directly counter the Taliban propaganda that accuses NATO of pursuing an anti-Islamic, 'crusader' agenda." (page 24) As P.W. Singer said in his book Wired for War, “The message you think you are sending is not always the one that the other side actually receives.” (page 305) In understanding that clarity of message is vital to successful COIN, this kind of activity, restoring key facets of the Muslim faith, seems extremely important.

The report suggests the use of what it calls non-violent security instruments (NVSIs), “including measures such as refugee aid, effective counter-narcotics policies, the preparation of suitable refugee camps and medical assistance,” (page 12) were missing from the follow-on operations. Although these were, as the report points out profusely, meticulously planned, it seems that they were somewhat lacking in the application. The focus instead was on

In terms of future operations, the ICOS report suggests that these lessons must be learned quickly, before the planned NATO operation in Kandahar this summer. In concert with the assertions in the ICOS report, is this Asia Times Online article suggesting that “across the border in Pakistan, the tribal areas are not, as had been planned, cleared of militants.” This sort of mission creep is a key factor in the ‘balloon effect’.

NATO risks, indeed is, pushing the Taliban over the border into Pakistan and having to chase the problem there. The controversial drone war there is leading to significant diplomatic tensions.

Lessons need to be learned before Kandahar. Fortunately, some lessons appear to be being learned on the way. Perhaps one day they'll get the hang of it. However, both this blog and The Full Force of the Wind criticised Moshtarak in COIN terms. While provision was promised from the outset, it wasn't forthcoming.

Seems unfair to keep score, but I'd call this 1-0 to the Taliban.

Better luck next time, guys!

A Slight Change In Focus

Or perhaps a move to becoming more focused. I think that this blog will continue to focus on the future of conflict, but it is also likely to become far more concerned about the role of narcotics in conflict; particularly in the conflict in Afghanistan.

This might be because I am about to embark on eighteen months of researching and writing about those topics, but it's also because this is what I think that I have been called to do. And from a second reading of Steven Pressfield's The War of Art, I feel like it is more important than ever that I take this up.

Pressfield's book suggests that the more "Resistance" one feels towards a particular goal, whatever it may be, the more important it is for one to pursue it. Although this might sound counter-intuitive, a lot of what he says makes a lot of sense. This post is part of the first steps to creating a better life for myself (I'll be honest with that from the outset) but also, it will be about improving the lives of people all over the world.

This is all done in the name of something unnameable, but bigger than myself. These words are not preplanned. I am simply moving my fingers on the keyboard.